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Disagreement, Equal Weight and Commutativity 
 
Alastair Wilson 




How should we respond to cases of disagreement where two epistemic agents have the 
same evidence but come to different conclusions? Adam Elga has provided a Bayesian 
framework for addressing this questioni. In this paper, I shall highlight two unfortunate 
consequences of this framework, which Elga does not anticipate.  
 
Elga calls his proposal the ‘equal weight view’, and gives the following formulation: 
  
Equal weight view: 
Upon finding out that an advisor disagrees, your probability that you are right 
should equal your prior conditional probability that you would be right. Prior to 
what? Prior to your thinking through the disputed issue, and finding out what the 
advisor thinks of it. Conditional on what? On whatever you have learned about the 
circumstances of the disagreement. 
Elga (ibid.), p.490 
 
This proposal, puzzlingly, seems to amount to nothing more than the following: 
’conditionalize on new evidence, where the evidence is information about the circumstances of 
disagreement’. This advice corresponds exactly to standard conditionalizationii.  By itself, it 
does not deserve to be called the ’equal weight view’: the ’conditionalization view’ might be a 
better name. To see why, notice that it’s entirely compatible with Elga’s formulation that 
your prior conditional credence distribution should amount to one of the following: ’in all 
cases of disagreement with agent A, whatever the circumstances, stick to your original 
credences’, or ’in all cases of disagreement with agent B, whatever the circumstances, believe 
that B is correct’. There is no equal weighting involved in these distributions. 
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So why does Elga give his view the name that he does? The puzzle is resolved by 
noticing that the ‘equal weighting’ element of the view depends on our treating an advisor as 
an ‘epistemic peer’. The notion of an epistemic peer is in fact the key element of the equal 
weight view. Elga defines it as follows:  
 
On my usage, you count your friend as an epistemic peer with respect to an about-
to-be-judged claim if and only if you think that, conditional on the two of you 
disagreeing about the claim, the two of you are equally likely to be mistaken. 
Elga (ibid.), p.487 n.21 
 
A consequence of this is that, if you treat someone as an epistemic peer, it must be the 
case that your prior credence in their being right, conditional on a neutral disagreement (one 
with no special factors that make you think either of you more or less likely to be right than 
usual), is 50%. Elga explicitly acknowledges this elsewhere:  
 
Suppose that before evaluating a claim, you think that you and your friend are 
equally likely to evaluate it correctly. When you find out that your friend disagrees 
with your verdict, how likely should you think it that you are correct? The equal 
weight view says: 50%.  
Elga (ibid.), p.488 
 
The general strategy is therefore that in cases of neutral disagreement with an epistemic 
peer (with respect to a particular proposition P) we should adjust our credence in P so as to 
meet the peer halfway. Thus, if I judge it to be 30% likely that the world will end tomorrow, 
and a peer judges it to be 70% likely, and we each know, say, the contents of every newspaper 
yet published (and nothing more), we should each end up with 50% credence in the world 
ending tomorrow. 
 
Could Elga deny that he is committed to this sort of ‘averaging’ view? I have two 
main reasons for thinking that he is indeed committed to it. Firstly, the following passage 
strongly suggests the view: 
...note that one might have differing assessments of an advisor’s abilities with respect 
to different issues. For example, one might count an advisor as a peer with respect 
to arithmetic, but as less than a peer with respect to disputes about euthanasia. So 
despite the name, the equal weight view does not in general call for simply averaging 
together one’s probability function with that of one’s advisor. 
Elga (ibid.), p.489 
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Elga’s reason for claiming that the equal weight view does not in general call for 
averaging one’s entire credence functions with that of a peer is only that one may count an 
advisor as a peer with respect to some issues but not others. I may rate you as a peer when it 
comes to predicting football results, but not when it comes to predicting election results. But 
when this kind of reason is absent – when two agents count themselves as peers with respect 
to every issue – Elga clearly recommends averaging. 
 
 Moreover, note that even if we do not count an advisor as a peer on all issues, we can 
have disagreements with them which relate to only those issues about which we do count 
them a peer. In such a case, a natural extrapolation of the equal weight view calls for 
averaging with the advisor that part of our credence function which relates to the issue in 
question. 
 
 Another reason for thinking that Elga is committed to the averaging view is that he 
gives us no other account of how to incorporate equal weighting into our credences. That is to 
say, it is unclear that the equal weight view recommends a positive strategy at all, if it does 
not recommend averaging your credences with an advisor (at least about the issues with 
respect to which you consider that advisor an epistemic peer.) 
 
Interpreted as an (at least partial) averaging proposal, the equal weight view has 
plenty of initial plausibility. If I treat someone as an epistemic peer, I should respect his 
credences exactly as much as my own; and a natural Bayesian implementation of this respect 
is to meet the peer’s credences halfway. But this plausibility is easily undermined, as I shall 
now argue. 
 
In general epistemic agents who endorse the equal weight view will need to update 
their credences both by averaging out credences with epistemic peers when they learn of 
disagreements and by conditionalization on other evidence. The problem to which I want to 
draw attention concerns the interaction between evidence of disagreement and other evidence. 
In general the combination of conditionalization on other evidence and application of the 
equal weight view by epistemic peers will not satisfy the requirement of commutativity; that 
is, the credences agents end up with will depend on the order in which they receive new 
evidence and learn of disagreements. This has long been recognized in the literature on 
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Bayesian updating and disagreement; however, the examples to follow aim to show that non-
commutativity is difficult to live with.   
 
To get a clearer idea of non-commutativity, consider the analogy of a price in a shop 
that has been reduced in a sale. A tree initially on sale for $100 is marked ‘reduced by $5’, 
since it has finished blossoming, and ‘reduced by 20%’, since the January sales are in progress. 
In which order should the reductions be applied? If the price is first reduced by 20%, and then 
by $5, the resultant price is $75; if the $5 reduction comes first, the resultant price is $76. The 
two processes of addition and multiplication are, like conditionalization and averaging of 
credences, not commutative. In the case of the tree, the shop can freely choose to charge the 
higher price. Unfortunately, non-commutativity raises problems in the epistemic case, as the 
following example shows. 
 
Two agents, who consider each other epistemic peers and have equal access to 
information about coin tossing dynamics and bias distributions, come to different conclusions 
about the bias of a coin. One thinks that a bias towards heads is 80% likely, the other thinks 
that it is 20% likely. They each are sure that the coin is either fair or biased in such a way 
that it lands heads every time. Now at t1 the toin is tossed, and lands heads, and the result is 
shown to the pair; at t2, the two confer and average out their credences in accordance with 
the equal weight view. The equal weight view, due to the failure of commutativity, predicts a 
difference in final credence for the agents between cases in which t1 is earlier than t2, and 
cases in which the order of these two times is reversed. 
 
Consider first the limiting case where one agent begins with credence 1 that the coin 
is biased, and the other with credence 0. In this case, conditionalization will not alter either 
agent’s credence at all if it is applied before the equal weight view, but will alter it if applied 
afterwards. The limiting case does not raise a direct problem for Elga’s proposal, since Elga 
takes evidence to be any proposition given credence 1, and by hypothesis the agents have 
exactly the same evidence available. However, the same kind of problem arises for cases other 
than the limiting case, as I will now argue. 
 
Assume one agent begins with credence 0.8 in a bias and the other with credence 0.2. 
If the agents compare first, their credences in a bias are averaged to 0.5 according to the equal 
weight view. If a heads result is then observed, conditionalization excludes half of the possible 
 5
cases of fairness, so a bias will now seem twice as likely to them as fairness, and the agents’ 
credences in the bias increase as follows: 
 
0.5 goes to  
0.5)-0.5(1(0.5
0.5 + = 0.666… 
 
If the agents flip first, and conditionalize on a result of heads, then their credences in the bias 
change as follows: 
 
0.8 goes to  
0.8)-0.5(1(0.8
0.8 + = 0.888…      0.2 goes to  0.2)-0.5(1(0.2
0.2 + = 0.333… 
 
Applying the equal weight view and taking the average of these, the agents’ final credences 
that the coin is biased towards heads will be 0.6111111. For other initial credence 
distributions that average to 0.5, the following results are obtained: 
 
0.6 → 0.75, 0.4 → 0.5701, average is 0.660 
0.9 → 0.9473, 0.1→ 0.1818, average is 0.565 
0.99 → 0.9945, 0.01 → 0.0202, average is 0.508 
 
If the agents compare views first, their final credences always end up as 0.666..., 
whatever their initial divergence. If the agents flip first, their final credences will vary between 
.5 and .666… depending on how far their initial credences diverged. Hence the end result 
when comparing first will always be different from the end result when flipping first, unless 
the agents start off with the same credence; in this case, there is no trouble, as there is no 
disagreement in the first place. The greater the disagreement, the greater the problem the 
failure of commutativity generates for the equal weight view. 
 
This failure of commutativity seems troubling, but perhaps we could learn to live 
with the dependency of our credences on the order in which we receive evidence. 
Unfortunately, there is a further problem to worry about. When t1 = t2 (that is, when one 
simultaneously learns of the disagreement and obtains pertinent evidence) the value predicted 
by the equal weight view for the final credences is undefined, since the order in which the two 
processes should be applied is unconstrained. An agent will not be uniquely guided by the 
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equal weight view if he cannot distinguish any time difference between learning the result of 
the coin toss and learning his peer’s original opinion about the bias. 
 
We cannot avoid this second problem by simply denying that it is possible to discover 
a disagreement and learn of the result of a coin flip at exactly the same time. In certain cases, 
learning of a disagreement is itself a source of evidence, so that conditionalization and the 
averaging of credences have to operate simultaneously. The problem can best be illuminated 
with another example. Two agents, who have the same evidence and take each other to be 
epistemic peers, are wondering whether or not they disagree about more than one thing at 
time tiii. At t, one agent thinks the probability of more-than-single-disagreement is 0.1; the 
other thinks the probability is 0.9. They voice their opinions on this matter at time t+1 and 
each decides to average his credence with his peer, in accordance with the equal weight view. 
But at t+1 they have also found through comparing notes that they disagreed about at least 
one thing (the probability in question) at t; so both of their credences in more-than-single-
disagreement at t should go up via conditionalization. Now the question is – should 
conditionalization on this new evidence occur before or after the application of the equal 
weight view? Whether it happens before or after, the pair will end up agreeing on the 
probability of more-than-single-disagreement. However, the actual credence that the pair of 
them ends up with will be different depending on the order of application. Given that the two 
processes in fact occur simultaneously, it looks like there can be no good reason to prefer one 
order over anotheriv. 
 
 Note that the problem generalizes to cases of disagreement with agents other than 
those we count as epistemic peers. If I have any respect whatsoever for an agent’s epistemic 
abilities, and if we share all the relevant evidence, Elga’s model suggests that in cases of 
disagreement I should adjust my credences towards his to some degree or other. But any 
adjustment of this sort is enough to provide a commutativity problem with conditionalization. 
The only special cases of the ‘equal weight view’ that avoid this problem are the cases in 
which you ignore an agent completely, or in which you take their credences to be always 
correct. 
 
I agree with the intuition behind Elga’s proposal, that partial deference is the right 
approach to take in actual cases of disagreement. We should certainly take others’ views into 
account, and not dogmatically prioritize our own credences. But unless we can live with both 
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the non-commutativity and the indeterminacy that I have alluded to, this deference needs to 
be modelled in a different way from Elga’s proposalvvi. 
  
 
                                            
i Adam Elga, ‘Reflection and Disagreement’, Nous 41:3 pp.478-502 (2007). 
ii Elga does specify a coarse-graining constraint on circumstances of disagreement, but this won’t be 
relevant to my discussion. 
iii In the relevant sense, two agents disagree about more than one thing if there are two families of 
propositions, logically independent from each other, over which the two agents have different credence 
distributions. Obviously we can’t say that disagreeing about more than one thing is disagreeing about 
more than one proposition, since if two agents have different credences in p they will ipso facto have 
different credences in not-p. 
iv One possible response would be to take the average of the credences resulting from applying the 
processes in different orders. Another would be to insist that one of the two processes should always be 
applied first. Without independent motivation, such proposals seem unacceptably ad hoc. 
v I have more general concerns about Elga’s proposal, since it applies Bayesian methods, which 
assume logical infallibility, to scenarios more naturally thought of as involving imperfect reasoning. 
However, I will not pursue these concerns here. 
vi Thanks to an audience at Oxford, and particularly to Frank Arntzenius and John Hawthorne. 
